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RFID Security and Privacy 
 
Prof. Michel Arnaud 
University Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense 
 
Introduction 
 
The European Commission has published in May 2009 a recommendation “on 
the implementation of privacy and data protection principles in applications 
supported by radio-frequency identification”, which is designed to provide 
“guidance to Member States on the design and operation of RFID applications 
in a lawful, ethical and socially and politically acceptable way, respecting the 
right to privacy and ensuring protection of personal data.” This 
recommendation requires RFID operators to conduct a “Privacy and Data 
Protection Impact Assessment” before any RFID application is deployed, and 
make its results available to the competent authority. The RFID recommendation 
is also designed to promote “information and transparency on RFID use”, in 
particular through the development of “a common European sign developed by 
European Standardisation Organisations, with the support of concerned 
stakeholders”, designed “to inform individuals of the presence of readers”. 
 
RFID PIA (Privacy and Impact Assessment) process aims to reach several 
objectives: 
• to favor "privacy by design" by helping data controllers to address privacy and 
data protection before a product or service is deployed, 
• to help data controllers to address privacy and data protection risks in a 
comprehensive manner, an opportunity to reduce legal uncertainty and avoid 
loss of trust from consumers, 
• to help data controllers and data protection authorities to gain more insight into 
the privacy and data protection aspects of RFID applications. 
 
The industry has proposed a RFID PIA framework which classifies a RFID 
application into 4 possible levels: 
-Level 0: applications that do not process personal data and where tags are only 
manipulated by users, and which are rightly excluded from conducting a PIA. 
-Level 1: applications where no personal data is processed, yet tags are carried 
by individuals. 
-Level 2: applications which process personal data but where tags themselves do 
not contain personal data. 
-Level 3: applications where tags contain personal data. 
 If the RFID application level is determined to be 1 or above, the RFID operator 
is required to conduct a four part analysis of the application, with a level of 
detail that is proportionate to identified privacy and data protection implications. 
The first part is used to describe the RFID application. The second part allows 
highlighting control and security measures. The third part addresses user 
information and rights. The final part of the proposed PIA framework requires 
the RFID operator to conclude whether or not the RFID application is ready for 
deployment. As a result of the PIA process, the RFID operator will produce a 
PIA report that will be made available to the competent authority. 
 
For the industry, only levels 2 and 3 are to be submitted to a PIA because it 
considers that information contained in a level 0 tag are not personal. However 
level 1 rises concerns of Article 29 Working Party because tagged items carried 
by a person contain unique identifiers that could be read remotely. In turn, these 
unique identifiers could be used to recognize that particular person who will be 
tracked by a third party without her knowledge. When a unique (or multiple 
identifiers) is associated to a person, it falls in the definition of personal data set 
forth in Directive 95/46/EC, regardless of the fact that the “social identity” 
(name, address, etc.) of the person remains unknown (i.e. she is “identifiable” 
but not necessarily “identified”). Additionally, the unique number contained in a 
tag can also serve as a means to remotely identify items carried by a person, 
which in turn may reveal information about social status, health, or more. Even 
in those cases where a tag contains solely a number that is unique within a 
particular context and without additional personal data, care must be taken to 
address potential privacy and security issues if this tag is going to be carried by 
persons. The Working Party has urged the industry to fully address this issue, by 
clearly mentioning it as part of a revised risk assessment approach for level 1. 
 
This chapter will address issues of protecting privacy of RFID tag carriers in a 
“privacy by design” model which is described below on four different layers: 
legal aspects, policy services, technical specifications and security services. The 
idea is to provide easy-to-use tools to accept or not to be tracked at PIA level 1. 
In case of a negative decision, tags have to be deactivated. Authentication 
techniques are to be used to protect user identity for PIA levels 2 and 3. Security 
measures have also to be taken to protect personal information on RFID tags 
against information leak which could lead to identity theft. 
 
Legal framework 
 
Personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person („data subject‟). An identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to 
one or more factors specific to their physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity. Personal data exist in many digital forms and are 
included in browsers as certificates; mobile phones are generally related to an 
individual;  home, appliances and clothing may include technology (e.g. smart 
metering, Internet of Things and RFID) which represent owner or user‟s 
identity; social networking sites reflect personal information in great detail  
including : digital information stored in databases, video, pictures, documents, 
files, notebooks, invoices, medical records, RFID, ID cards, passports, cookies, 
flash objects, eID middleware, biometric identifiers (e.g. fingerprints, DNA, 
etc.). 
 
Basic principles of Directive 95-46 of the European Parliament include the 
following regarding protected data: fairly and lawfully processed, for limited, 
adequate, relevant and not excessive purposes, accurate and up to date, not kept 
for longer than necessary, processed in line with individual‟s rights, secure in 
processing, storage and transfer, not transferred to other countries without an 
adequate level of protection. 
 
Identity management   
 
The concept of “identity management” is not well defined with reference to 
currently available international standards, although there is relevant work in 
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27/WG5 “Identity management and privacy technologies”.  
 
An individual during its lifetime may have many multiple different personae, i.e. 
names, depending on the roles that it has or qualifies for. For example, at the 
time of marriage an individual may acquire and use a new (legal) persona. 
Consequently, an individual may have multiple legally recognized names 
(LRNs), recognized individual names (RINs), recognized individual identities 
(riis) at the same time (and so used in various business transactions). Examples 
include a persona which an individual assigns to himself and is one which also 
serves as an identifier such as an e-mail address (on a hotmail or gmail account, 
Facebook, Twitter, as an “avatar”, etc.).  
 
A recognized individual name is any persona associated with a role of an 
individual which is recognized as having legal status, i.e., if a legally recognized 
name (LRN) is recognized in a jurisdictional domain and accepted in 
compliance with the registration corresponding schema. Associated with a 
registered individual name is (usually) a registration number of the document 
attesting that the RIN has legal status of some kind. A registration authority shall 
assign a unique identifier to each of its registered members including and 
especially identifying where the member is acting as an individual. This unique 
identifier has the properties and behaviors of an ID code in the coded domain 
used to support management and maintenance of the registration authority 
schema.  
 
From an eBusiness perspective, one often does not need to distinguish whether 
the entity which is party to a business transaction is a "natural person" or "legal 
person", or an "individual" or "organization", etc. Credit worthiness, ability to 
pay, secure payment, etc., of a "person", as a buyer, is often a more important 
criterion for doing business with the person in the role of seller based 
applications, business (including e-commerce, e-government, e-health, etc.). 
This is particularly so when modeling Open-edi scenarios and scenario 
components from an internal constraints perspective only. In much of consumer 
trade, a buyer can remain anonymous vis-à-vis a seller by presenting a money 
token in which a seller has 100% trust (e.g., cash).  
 
Privacy protection requirements have made “anonymity” an external constraint 
matter which needs to be supported. At times it is desired that an individual can 
establish a long-term relationship (including a reputation, trust relationship, 
etc.), with some other person, without the individual‟s actual identity being 
disclosed. For convenience, it may be useful for the individual, or the other party 
concerned, to establish a unique (new) persona, identifier, token, etc., known as 
“pseudonym” with the other person. Pseudonymization is recognized as an 
important method for privacy protection of personal information. 
Pseudonymization techniques, mechanisms and services may be used within an 
organization or public administration, within a jurisdictional domain as a whole 
or across jurisdictional domains for transborder data flows. 
 
The following set of rules summarizes privacy protection requirements which 
apply. A buyer (and its agent(s)) or third party (or any other party to the business 
transaction), shall not retain any personal information on the individual as the 
buyer for any time longer than is consented to by the individual for post-
actualization purposes unless external constraints of the applicable jurisdictional 
domain requires retention of such personal information for a longer period. 
 
Good practices 
 
Good practices have been defined within the CEN/ISSS Workshop on Data 
Protection and Privacy (WS/DPP). Organizations should appoint a person who 
periodically checks whether notified information is still complete, accurate and 
up-to-date, or whether grounds for exemption are still valid. The principal 
purpose of having notification and a public register is transparency and 
openness. It is a basic principle of data protection that the public should know 
who is carrying out the processing of personal information as well as other 
details about processing. Notification, therefore, serves the interests of 
individuals by helping them understand how personal information is being 
processed by data controllers.  
 
Data subject has the right of access, rectification, erasure, blocking and 
objection to retention. Data controller should respect these rights. Under Section 
3 of the Directive, data subjects have the right to find out, free of charge, if any 
entity (either an individual or an organization) holds information about them. 
They might also request a description of the information and inquire about the 
purpose(s) for holding their information. 
 
Anyone having access to the organization‟s documents, media, computers or 
information systems is responsible for complying with the information security 
policy and all other associated documentation that is applicable to it. The 
information security policy will preserve an appropriate level of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, lawful purpose. Support contractors who have access to 
sensitive information in paper, electronic or other format should sign a written 
agreement stating they will comply and adhere to organization‟s policies to keep 
information secure. Their compliance should be monitored to verify they adhere 
to these obligations. 
 
PIA framework for RFID 
 
A privacy impact assessment (PIA) enables organizations to anticipate and 
address likely data protection impacts of proposed initiatives and foresee 
problems. This process reflects measures taken to protect privacy of individuals 
about whom sensitive data are kept and addresses legal obligation to use 
appropriate security measures. Systems should be designed to avoid unnecessary 
privacy intrusion and with privacy-by-design features implemented to reduce 
possibility or effects of a security incident. 
 Individuals responsible for data protection (including their processing service 
provider) should be identified in the security policy. These documents identify 
roles, individual responsibilities, incident handling and reporting practices that 
have been put in place to protect personal data and their processing with 
appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure, that at all times, 
integrity, confidentiality and availability of personal/sensitive data. 
 
The PIA Framework for RFID of January 12, 2011 explains key concepts, 
internal procedures and classification criteria for RFID applications. For these 
criteria the PIA Framework provides a two phases approach. The initial analysis 
phase is used to determine if a PIA of RFID application is required. The 
decision, to which level an application belongs, has to be made after working 
through a decision tree where level 1 implies a small scale PIA while levels 2 
and 3 require a full scale PIA. If an application is designed according to level 0 
which means that no private data are concerned, there is no privacy threat given 
and further documentation is not needed. Level 2 applications may have controls 
to protect back-end data while level 3 applications may have controls to protect 
both back-end data and tag data. For level 1 applications, required controls and 
corresponding documentation in the PIA report are simplified. 
 
The objective of the risk assessment phase is to document how risks are pro-
actively mitigated through technical and organizational controls. The PIA 
process requires any RFID application operator to: 
1. Describe the RFID application; 
2. Identify and list how the RFID application under review could threaten 
privacy and estimate the magnitude and likelihood of those risks; 
3. Document current and proposed technical and organizational controls to 
mitigate identified risks; 
4. Document the resolution (results of the analysis) regarding the application. 
The risk assessment requires evaluating the applicable risks from a privacy 
perspective. The RFID operator should consider: 
a. The significance of a risk and the likelihood of its occurrence. 
b. The magnitude of the impact should the risk occur. 
The resulting risk level can then be classified as low, medium or high. A prime 
risk is that RFID tags could be used for profiling and/or tracking of individuals. 
In this case RFID tag‟s information – in particular its identifier(s) – would be 
used to re-identify a particular individual. Retailers who pass RFID tags on to 
customers without automatically deactivating or removing them at checkout may 
unintentionally enable this risk. A key question, though, is whether this risk is 
likely and actually materializes into an undismissable risk or not. 
 
According to recommendation, retailers should deactivate or remove at the point 
of sale, tags used in their application unless consumers, after being informed of 
the policy in accordance with this framework, give their consent to keep tags 
operational. Retailers are not required to deactivate or remove tags if the PIA 
report concludes that tags that are used in a retail application and would remain 
operational after the point of sale do not represent a likely threat to privacy or 
protection of personal data. 
 
The RFID operator should use categories below to indicate privacy and data 
protection implications of the RFID application: 
-Ready for deployment: the RFID application as described provides for suitable 
practices, controls, and accountability. 
-Not ready for deployment: the RFID application is not approved for operations 
in its current state. A specific corrective action plan has to be developed, and a 
new privacy impact assessment has to be performed and documented to 
determine if the application has reached an approvable state.  
 
The PIA Framework provides only a generic scheme for the PIA and has to be 
complemented by more detailed schemes like roles, security targets, classes and 
templates reflecting the special aspects of industry-specific and individual 
applications. 
 
Technical guidelines as templates for PIA 
 
The approach of the European Commission suggests using so-called templates 
as extensions to the Framework document in order to reach the level of detail 
that is necessary to conduct a complete application-specific Privacy Impact 
Assessment. Such templates are specific to an application area and should 
provide a detailed guidance for the creation of a PIA report. This puts the 
“Technical Guidelines for the Secure Use of RFID” (TG RFID) into perspective 
which have been issued by Germany‟s Federal Office for Information Security 
(BSI). In 2007 the BSI launched this project which aims at providing technical 
recommendations for RFID systems that ensure secure implementations and 
protection of personal data but nevertheless support RFID operators‟ and service 
providers‟ business needs. The BSI achieved a consensus between supporters 
and critics. TG RFID are accepted by relevant parties and are now available for 
application areas: public transport, event ticketing, NFC-ticketing, retail & 
logistics and employee cards. First implementations proved practicality and 
viability of this approach.  
 
A major goal of development for the TG RFID is to find a consensus and to gain 
acceptance of all relevant stakeholders. Therefore the BSI installed an intense 
review and alignment process and invited experts and relevant stakeholders from 
specific application area to participate. Representatives of RFID operators, 
service providers, customers, Data Protection Agencies (DPAs) and also critics 
of RFID have had the opportunity to comment early versions of the document 
and take part in review and alignment sessions. In this process, security goals, 
potential threats, security measures and especially remaining risks were 
identified, discussed and described. This process provided information on 
potential impact and risks of RFID applications and generated transparency that 
is necessary to build trust and acceptance. So far Technical Guidelines for five 
application areas have been created. In all cases a consensus including 
acceptance from participating DPAs was achieved. 
Unfortunately, TG RFID for logistics and retail have not been piloted so far, 
because progress with RFID in this sector is far behind former projections by 
retail stakeholders. RFID tags are actually mostly used on pallets and cartons. 
Products in supermarkets shelves are still only marked with traditional bar codes 
or with GS1 data bar, except cases like Gillette razors. Whereas in the sectors of 
ticketing, NFC (13.56MHz) and employee cards (125 kHz HID) a great progress 
with RFID is on its way. 
 
TG RFID provide patterns for application specific templates which can be 
efficiently set up as required by PIA Framework.  
 
Stakeholders of an application have individual and sometimes diverging 
requirements for a technical guideline. Data Protection Agencies (DPAs) want to 
protect data and privacy of citizens, customers and employees. TG RFID address 
their objectives by a detailed description of all relevant threats, appropriate 
safeguards and potentially remaining risks. Operators are focused on their 
business objectives. Their intention is on practicality, acceptance of their 
customers and a cost efficient and future proof solution.  Balance between 
objectives of both parties is achieved by a scalable definition of safeguards. 
Minor threats are mitigated by simple, low-cost safeguards. Strong and costly 
controls are only applied in case of high protection demand and severe threats. 
This approach makes sure that cost of security measures and impact on usability 
are reduced to what is necessary. 
Interoperability is an imperative for RFID implementations. Operators need to 
cooperate with business partners and customers want to use services from 
multiple service providers and across borders. This requires standardized and 
interoperable technical interfaces and security measures. In addition, 
comparability of security levels is of major importance. Operators can only 
cooperate if they can trust partner's system implementation. This includes a 
certain level of data protection, privacy and as well information security and 
safety. TG RFID support these fundamental requirements by two dedicated 
features: 
I. TG RFID include not only an assessment of privacy and data 
protection. In addition, a risk analysis and documentation of 
information security and safety is provided. The latter is mandatory 
to cover business requirements of operators. 
II. Risk assessment methodology and documentation of results 
comply with worldwide standard ISO27005. This makes it easy to 
compare PIA and security assessment reports of different 
implementations and systems.  
 
Operators will refrain from investing in RFID applications if they can't 
determine the cost of security measures and their potential impact on services 
and usability. Both aspects have major influence on the overall business case. 
TG RFID define appropriate technical safeguards for specific scenarios of an 
application. This information builds a solid base for cost calculations and 
tenders. This feature of TG RFID counters a major roadblock for introduction of 
RFID. 
The European Commission identified lacking confidence in legal situation for 
RFID-implementations as one major roadblock for the broad adoption of RFID. 
Use of TG RFID is not mandatory in a legal sense. Nevertheless they will 
provide a solid basis for legal judgments of RFID applications because they are 
accepted by all stakeholders and represent the current state-of-the-art for 
implementations of RFID. 
 
Description of structure and security methodology of TG RFID 
 
TG RFID are created for specific application areas and consist of three major 
parts: the description of the application area, the assessments and the 
recommendations. A detailed but generic description of all service and business 
models of an application area is given in the first part. This is the foundation for 
assessments and recommendations and covers role models, services, products, 
business processes, use cases and any other information that may be relevant for 
security and privacy assessments. In order to ensure practicality and usability for 
all service providers and operators, this part is done in close cooperation and 
alignment with experts from the application domain. 
The assessment part is based on description of application area and specific 
security targets. It covers all three domains of information security: security, 
privacy and safety. Security targets are defined and aligned with all stakeholders. 
Methodology of risk assessment is compliant with ISO 27005. Results of 
assessment are a list of relevant threats, appropriate safeguards that can mitigate 
these threats and a description of remaining risks. 
The third part of guidelines document provides recommendations on how to 
implement an RFID-system in an appropriate way. Based on example scenarios 
from the application domain it is shown how findings of risk assessment are 
transformed into specific safeguards that should be applied to the relevant 
system components. This provides a clear and economically viable guidance for 
the design of system.  
Organizations must be able to demonstrate that they have implemented a data 
protection management system (DPMS) using appropriate technology (PETs) 
and operational protective measures (OPMs) to protect personal data. PIAs 
incorporate tests of PETS and OPMs to prove data protection principles are met 
by the system. All personnel within the organization have a responsibility to 
ensure that they take steps to safeguard security of information that they are 
entrusted with and to use OPMs and PETs as established policy. 
 
Privacy framework models 
OASIS Privacy Management Reference Model (PMRM) 
 
OASIS Privacy Management Reference Model (PMRM) Technical committee 
aims at achieving a standard-based framework that will help business process 
engineers, IT analysts, architects, and developers implement privacy and 
security policies in their operations. PMRM picks up where broad privacy 
policies leave off. Most policies describe fair information practices and 
principles but offer little insight into actual implementation. PMRM provides a 
guideline or template for developing operational solutions to privacy issues. It 
also serves as an analytical tool for assessing the completeness of proposed 
solutions and as the basis for establishing categories and groupings of privacy 
management controls. 
 
This model is based on a service-based approach, describing them in three 
categories: 
- core policy services : agreements (with options and permissions), control 
(with policies and data management), 
- presentation and lifecycle services : interaction (manages 
data/preferences/notice), agent (software that carries out processes), usage (data 
use, aggregation, anonymization), access (individual review/updates to personal 
information), 
- privacy assurance services : certification (credentials, trusted processes), 
audit (independent, verifiable accountability), validation (checks accuracy of 
personal information), enforcement (including redress for violations) 
Personal information is stored in a container accessed by an agent (at entry 
point) for specific processing which must abide to privacy rules (referred to as 
agreement and control procedures). Assurance service guarantees conformity to 
these rules which can be a simple validation or a certification, leading eventually 
to an audit and an enforcement procedure. 
 
Each use case invokes a sequence of service calls. Each service call executes a 
sequence of functions: define (operational requirements), select (input, process, 
and output) data and parameters, input (data and parameter values in accordance 
with select), process (data and parameter values within functions), output (data, 
parameter values and actions), link to other services, secure with appropriate 
security functions. 
 
Open Identity Exchange Trust Framework 
 
In the context of digital identity systems, a trust framework is a certification 
program that enables a party who accepts a digital identity credential (called the 
relying party) to trust the identity, security, and privacy policies of the party who 
issues the credential (called the identity service provider) and vice versa. In the 
Open Identity Trust Framework (OITF) model, an open identity trust framework 
provider can administer any trust framework that meets: 1) the principles of 
openness, and 2) any additional requirements imposed by the Trust Framework 
Provider (TFP). 
 
The rules of every trust framework are defined for a particular set of participants 
in online (and possibly offline) interactions. The Open Identity Trust Framework 
Model defines six standard trust framework roles (in addition to the trust 
framework provider role played by OIX):  
1. Users 
2. Identity service providers 
3. Relying parties 
4. Assessors 
5. Auditors 
6 . Dispute resolution service providers 
7 . In addition, OIX has defined a seventh role, special assessor, which is an 
assessor responsible for assessing the qualifications of other assessors. 
 
As defined in the Open Identity Trust Framework Model, a level of assurance 
(LOA) is a unit of measure for the degree of confidence a relying party can have 
in assertions for an identity credential from an identity provider. A level of 
protection (LOP) is a unit of measure for the degree of confidence: a) an identity 
provider can have in the protection provided by a relying party for the identity 
information disclosed in an identity credential, or b) a user can have in the 
protection provided by an identity provider and/or a relying party for the identity 
information disclosed in an identity credential. 
 
Technical profiles 
 
A technical profile is a specification of requirements for use of a specific 
technology, RFID in our case, in order to achieve technical interoperability in 
exchange of digital identity credentials that is consistent with associated LOA or 
LOP. Once an OIX trust framework is accepted for listing in the OIX Listing 
Service, participants may apply for certification.  
 
For RFID open identity trust technical profile, four main functions have to be 
taken into consideration to provide appropriate tools for agents: anonymization 
and pseudonymization facilities, attributes management tools, identity 
management tools, security management tools. 
 
Conclusion 
 
All TG RFID follow a common security concept. Whereas RFID 
Recommendation is primarily directed towards privacy and data protection, TG 
RFID cover all three security domains: safety, security and privacy. 
Furthermore, TG RFID provide detailed guidance how to carry out all detailed 
work PIA Framework leaves out, because it is understood as a high level 
document more for senior management and non-IT people. TG RFID are written 
for IT experts who are responsible for designing systems, investigating threats 
and weaknesses and providing for the right protection provisions. Definition of 
generic controls and proposition of scenario-specific safeguards are carried out 
as a joint approach. This reflects the fact that threats for privacy are often threats 
to information security as well. Vice versa certain safeguards can counter threats 
for privacy and information security. The approach of TGs optimizes the impact 
of safeguards and minimizes cost of security and privacy and complements PIA 
Framework. 
TG RFID provide guidance and information that will enable operators to 
conduct a PIA and minimize efforts for completing the report. Major parts of the 
PIA can simply be covered by referencing appropriate chapters as templates and 
selecting particular services, processes and scenarios mentioned in the guideline. 
This will work out in most cases because TG are describing all known 
eventualities of an application area. The operator's application will normally be a 
subset of what is documented. Furthermore TG RFID provide detailed patterns 
to develop templates as required by the PIA Framework. All this brings quality 
of compliance statement to a level that can be trusted by all parties that will deal 
with RFID-based systems.  
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Glossary 
 
Individual anonymity. The state of not knowing the identity or not having any 
recording of personal information on or about an individual. 
 
Anonymization process. Whereby the association between a set of recorded 
information (SRI) and an identifiable individual is removed. 
 
Information Security. Preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information. 
 
Monitor. Carrying out an activity for the purpose of detecting, observing, 
copying or recording the location, movement, activities, or state of an 
individual. 
 
Personal Data. Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person ("data subject"); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to 
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity. 
 
RFID Application. An application that processes data through the use of tags 
and readers, and which is supported by a back-end system and a networked 
communication infrastructure. 
 
RFID Application Operator. The natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency, or any other body, which, alone or jointly with others, determines the 
purposes and means of operating an Application, including controllers of 
personal data using an RFID Application. 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). The use of electromagnetic radiating 
waves or reactive field coupling in the radio frequency portion of the spectrum 
to communicate to or from a tag through a variety of modulation and encoding 
schemes to uniquely read the identity of a radio frequency tag or other data 
stored on it. 
 
RFID Reader. A fixed or mobile data capture and identification device using a 
radio frequency electromagnetic wave or reactive field coupling to stimulate and 
effect a modulated data response from a tag or group of tags. 
 
RFID Tag or ‘tag’. An RFID device having the ability to produce a radio signal 
or an RFID device which re-couples, back-scatters or reflects (depending on the 
type of device) and modulates a carrier signal received from a reader or writer. 
 
RFID Tag Information or information on the RFID Tag. The information 
contained in  an RFID Tag and transmitted when the RFID Tag is queried by an 
RFID Reader. 
 
User. Specifically, an RFID Application User, i.e., a person (or other entity, such 
as a legal entity) who directly interacts with one or more components of an 
RFID Application (e.g., back-end system, communications infrastructure, RFID 
Tag) for the purposes of operating an RFID Application or exercising one or 
more of its functions. 
 
